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Abstract
There is broad consensus that the prefrontal cortex supports goal-directed, model-based decision-making. Consistent with
this, we have recently shown that model-based control can be impaired through transcranial magnetic stimulation of right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in humans. We hypothesized that an enhancement of model-based control might be achieved
by anodal transcranial direct current stimulation of the same region. We tested 22 healthy adult human participants in a
within-subject, double-blind design in which participants were given Active or Sham stimulation over two sessions. We
show Active stimulation had no effect on model-based control or on model-free (‘habitual’) control compared to Sham
stimulation. These null effects are substantiated by a power analysis, which suggests that our study had at least 60% power
to detect a true effect, and by a Bayesian model comparison, which favors a model of the data that assumes stimulation had
no effect over models that assume stimulation had an effect on behavioral control. Although we cannot entirely exclude
more trivial explanations for our null effect, for example related to (faults in) our experimental setup, these data suggest that
anodal transcranial direct current stimulation over right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex does not improve model-based
control, despite existing evidence that transcranial magnetic stimulation can disrupt such control in the same brain region.
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Introduction
Electrical stimulation of the human brain has received
widespread attention over recent years. It has been used to study
the function of healthy cortex [1], connectivity between regions
[2], as an avenue for treatment in disorders such as depression,
Parkinson’s disease and stroke [3–6], and to improve normal
function such as in skill learning [7,8].
Here we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), a
technique whereby two electrodes are placed on the skull and a
fixed current level is applied [9]. This technique is reported to
increase and decrease the excitability of the neural tissue
underlying the anodal and cathodal electrode respectively [8,9].
A number of studies have suggested that high-level cognition can
be improved by anodal stimulation of the prefrontal cortex.
Specifically, stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC) has been shown to decrease risk-taking [10], improve
working memory [11,12] and improve classification learning [13].
We attempted to influence the process of decision-making
through anodal stimulation of the right dlPFC. Decision-making is
often dissected into a slow, deliberative, goal-directed component
and a fast, automatic, habitual component [14–16]. In value-based
choice, such a distinction is made as model-based versus model-
free control [15,17]. A model-free system learns a cached value for
each action based on reward prediction errors and guides behavior
based on these alone, trading a minimum of computational effort
against a relative lack of flexibility in adjusting to current goals.
Model-based control, by contrast, dynamically computes optimal
actions by forward planning, a process that is computationally
demanding but allows for flexible, outcome-specific behavioral
repertoires [15].
We focused on the right dlPFC based on evidence for its role in
model-based processes such as the construction and use of
associative models [18–20] and the coding of hypothetical
outcomes [21]. Work on non-human primates also implicates
the dlPFC as a site for convergence of reward and contextual
information [22]. Furthermore, we recently showed that right, but
not left, dlPFC is necessary for model-based control, evidenced by
a reduction in model-based control after disruptive theta-burst
transcranial magnetic stimulation to the right dlPFC [23]. Here we
sought to enhance, rather than disrupt, model-based control
through anodal stimulation. We used a task which has been shown
to quantify model-based and model-free control [24–26] and
tested participants undergoing anodal or Sham tDCS stimulation
to the right dlPFC in a double-blind, counterbalanced design. We
hypothesized that anodal stimulation would improve model-based
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control without affecting model-free control, an effect driven by an
enhancement of a component process of model-based control
subserved by the right dlPFC.
Materials and Methods
We recruited 23 healthy participants to participate in an
experiment over 2 sessions. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no history of psychiatric or
neurological disorders. One participant was excluded from
analysis due to failed stimulation after an increase in resistance
from drying electrodes, leaving 22 participants (11 female, mean
age6 SD: 22.565.3 years, all participants were at least 18 years of
age at the time of consent) for analysis.
Ethics Statement
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants
prior to the experiment and the UCL Research Ethics Committee
approved the study (project number 3450/003).
Setup of Experiment and Double-blinding Procedure
Participants were tested on 2 occasions between 3 and 8 days
apart, going through the same procedure on each day: after
obtaining informed consent we determined the electrode locations,
explained the task, guided participants through a short practice
session, placed the electrodes on the scalp, turned on stimulation,
and started the task. The experiment was double-blind, with both
experimenter and participant unaware of the stimulation condi-
tion (Active or Sham). This was achieved through a system of
blinding codes embedded in the stimulation machine (Neuro-
Conn, Germany). First, co-author GP selected 24 pairs of 5-digit
codes, each pair containing one code associated with Active and
one code associated with Sham stimulation as programmed into
the stimulation machine. These were then permuted such that half
the pairs had Active stimulation on session 1 and Sham stimulation
on session 2, whereas the other half of pairs had the reversed
order. GP kept the unblinded version of the codes and handed the
permuted set to PS, who acquired the data. Each participant was
assigned a pair in order of testing date. When the participant was
prepped for stimulation, their session-specific code was entered
into the stimulation machine, which then administered the
corresponding Active or Sham protocol without any indication
as to the stimulation condition. We tested the participant’s
awareness of the stimulation condition at the end of the
experiment (see below). PS was deblinded after acquisition of all
23 datasets.
Task
The task design was based on Daw et al. [24] and identical to
Wunderlich et al. [25] except for faster trial timings and a larger
number of trials. The task was programmed in Cogent 2000 &
Graphics (John Romaya, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimag-
ing and Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience development team,
UCL) in Matlab (The Mathworks Inc).
Each trial consisted of two choice stages. Each choice stage
contained a 2-alternative forced choice, with choice options
represented by a fractal in a colored box on a black background
(Figure 1A). On each choice participants had to respond within 2
seconds using the left/right cursor keys or the trial was aborted
and not rewarded. Missed trials were omitted from analysis.
Choice at the first stage always involved the same two stimuli.
After participants made their response the rejected stimulus
disappeared from the screen and the chosen stimulus moved to the
top of the screen. After 0.5 s one of two second stage stimulus pairs
appeared, with the transition from first to second stage following
fixed transition probabilities. Each first stage option was more
strongly (with a 70% transition probability) associated with one of
the two second stage pairs, a crucial factor in allowing us to
distinguish model-free from model-based behavior (see below). In
both stages the two choice options were randomly assigned to the
left and right side of the screen, forcing the participants to use a
stimulus- rather than action-based learning strategy. After the
second choice the chosen option remained on the screen together
with a reward symbol (a pound coin) or a ‘no reward’ symbol (a
red cross). Each of the four stimuli in stage two had a reward
probability between 0.2 and 0.8. These reward probabilities
drifted slowly and independently for each of the four second stage
options through a diffusion process with Gaussian noise (mean 0,
SD 0.025) on each trial. Three random walks were generated
beforehand and randomly assigned to sessions. We chose to pre-
select random walks as otherwise they might, by chance, turn out
to have relatively static optimal strategies (e.g. when a single
second-stage stimulus remains at or close to p(reward) = 0.8).
Prior to the experiment participants were explicitly instructed
that for each stimulus at the first stage one of the two transition
probabilities was higher than the other, and that these transition
probabilities remained constant throughout the experiment.
Participants were also told that reward probabilities on the second
stage would change slowly, randomly and independently over
time. On both days, participants practiced 50 trials with different
Figure 1. Two-step task design. (A) On each trial a choice between
two stimuli led probabilistically to one of two further pairs of stimuli,
which then demanded another choice followed probabilistically by
reward or no-reward. Participants could learn that each first-stage
stimulus led more often to one of the pairs; this task structure could be
exploited by a model-based, but not by a model-free controller. (B)
Model-based and model-free strategies for reinforcement learning
predict differences in feedback processing after uncommon transitions.
If choices were exclusively model-free, then a reward would increase
the likelihood of staying with the same stimulus on the next trial,
regardless of the type of transition (left). Alternatively, if choices were
driven by a model-based system, the impact of reward would interact
with the transition type (middle).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086850.g001
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stimuli before starting the task. The main task consisted of 350
trials with 20 s breaks every 70 trials. The participant’s bonus
money in pounds sterling was the total number of rewarded trials
minus 170, divided by 5. Added to this money was a flat rate of
£7/hour.
Analysis
We analyzed stay-switch behavior on the first choice of each
trial to dissociate the relative influence of model-based and model-
free control. A model-free reinforcement learning strategy predicts
that choices followed by rewards will lead to a repetition of that
choice, irrespective of whether it followed a common or
uncommon transition (Figure 1B, left). This is because model-
free choice works without considering structure in the environ-
ment. A reward after an uncommon transition would therefore
adversely increase the value of the chosen first stage cue without
updating the value of the unchosen cue. In contrast, under a
model-based strategy we expect an interaction between transition
and reward, because a rare transition inverts the effect of a
subsequent outcome (Figure 1B, middle). Under model-based
control, receiving a reward after an uncommon transition
increases the propensity to choose the previously unchosen first-
stage stimulus. This is because the rewarded second stage stimulus
can be more reliably accessed by choosing the rejected first stage
cue than by choosing the same cue again. To summarize, this
analysis quantifies model-free behavior as the strength of the main
effect of reward, and model-based behavior as the strength of the
reward by transition interaction, even when actual behavior is a
hybrid of model-free and model-based control (Figure 1B, right).
Whereas most studies using this task have only looked at the
preceding trial to explain choices on the current trial [24–26], here
we expanded on this approach to examine model-based and
model-free influences that go up to 3 trials back. This provides a
more fine-grained dissection of the influences of each system on
behavior. We used hierarchical logistic regression implemented in
lme4 [27] in the R software package. The dependent variable for
trial t was 1 when stimulus A was chosen and 0 when stimulus B
was chosen in the first stage. Each regressor then described
whether events on trial t-1, t-2, and t-3 would increase (coded as
+1) or decrease (coded as 21) the likelihood of choosing A
according to a model-based or model-free system. If a trial
contained a common transition the model-based and model-free
system would make identical predictions, whereas on trials with
uncommon transitions these predictions would be inverted. We
additionally modeled the main effect of transition type (common as
+1, uncommon as 21) on trial t-1, t-2 and t-3, which we predicted
would have no effect on the propensity to choose stimulus A. We
also tested 3 alternative models that used 1) one set of model-based
regressors for both conditions, 2) one set of model-free regressors
for both conditions and 3) one set of model-based and one set of
model-free regressors for both conditions (‘null model’). These
models allowed us to test whether the additional complexity of
having separate regressors for the stimulation conditions was
appropriate. These models were compared using the BIC and AIC
values provided by the lme4 package.
We estimated coefficients for the regressors shown in Table 1,
taking all coefficients as random effects over participants. That is,
the regression model is fit to each participant’s data while
simultaneously maximizing the likelihood of the parameters across
the population. This method accounts for both within- and
between-subject variance, providing unbiased estimates of the
population coefficient for each regressor. This hierarchical
approach is different from the more common approach whereby
a full model is fit to each participant separately, and statistics are
performed on the parameter estimates. The latter ignores within-
subject variance and is only concerned with variance between
subjects (i.e. random effects).
We then performed contrasts over the population coefficients to
test for differences between conditions in model-free and model-
based control. All p-values reported in the manuscript that pertain
to the logistic regression were estimated using the ‘‘esticon’’
procedure in the ‘‘doBy’’ package which relies on the chi-square
distribution [28]. Power analyses were performed using the Matlab
7.12.0 ‘sampsizepwr’ function and G*Power 3.1.7 [29,30]. Other
tests were performed in SPSS 17.0.
Stimulation
On both sessions the anodal electrode was placed over right
dlPFC and the cathodal electrode over the inion. The inion was
chosen for cathodal electrode placement in order to maximize
current flow through the dlPFC. The right dlPFC was located
using the 10/20 system, which is appropriate given the limited
level of spatial resolution of tDCS [31]. In brief, we first located
Fpz, Fz and Oz as 10%, 30% and 90% of the nasion-inion
distance, measured from the nasion. We then located F8 as 30% of
the distance between Fpz and Oz, measured from Fpz passing
over the ears. Electrode F4, commonly used for the right dlPFC
[31], was then determined as 50% of the distance between F8 and
Fz. We used conductive rubber electrodes inserted in a sponge
cover measuring 7.5 by 6 cm, secured to the head using a bandage.
We placed the electrode along the gyrus, i.e. the electrode was
placed in superior-medial to inferior-lateral direction.
We used a DC-stimulator system (NeuroConn, Germany). In
the Active condition a 2 mA current was delivered for 25 minutes
with 15 s ramping-up and ramping-down. In the Sham condition
Table 1. Regressors in the full model for first-stage choices.
regressor estimate SE z-value p
intercept 0.25 0.03 7.81 ,0.0001
Active 2264.18 194.46 21.36 0.1743
Active MF Lag-1 287.02 62.06 4.63 ,0.0001
Active MF Lag-2 293.64 50.73 5.79 ,0.0001
Active MF Lag-3 172.87 51.73 3.34 0.0008
Active MB Lag-1 244.48 72.35 3.38 0.0007
Active MB Lag-2 180.58 66.90 2.70 0.0069
Active MB Lag-3 200.76 44.92 4.47 ,0.0001
Sham MF Lag-1 374.51 51.11 7.33 ,0.0001
Sham MF Lag-2 287.55 54.85 5.24 ,0.0001
Sham MF Lag-3 246.79 59.53 4.15 ,0.0001
Sham MB Lag-1 226.13 64.93 3.48 0.0005
Sham MB Lag-2 207.15 77.43 2.68 0.0075
Sham MB Lag-3 170.37 60.91 2.80 0.0052
Active transition Lag-1 24.62 36.24 20.13 0.8985
Active transition Lag-2 9.20 32.34 0.28 0.7760
Active transition Lag-3 219.03 34.09 20.56 0.5767
Sham transition Lag-1 26.61 42.27 20.16 0.8758
Sham transition Lag-2 15.68 33.42 0.47 0.6389
Sham transition Lag-3 22.77 36.88 20.08 0.9400
MF=model-free; MB=model-based; SE = standard error. Lag denotes the effect
of time. Bold-face indicates p,.05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086850.t001
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the current ramped up then down over 15 s, and then performed
continuous impedance testing. This manipulation made it very
hard for the participant to tell which type of stimulation was given
at what time. We confirmed this by giving a 2-alternative forced-
choice at the very end of the experiment asking which session
contained the Active stimulation. This test showed that partici-
pants as a group were not significantly different from chance at
determining the session that contained Active stimulation (10 out
of 22 participants guessed correctly, binomial test, p = .83). We
employed a number of post-hoc checks to safeguard against
experimental error. Firstly, we monitored the resistance reported
by the DC-stimulator throughout the experiment, rejecting one
participant for whom stimulation was stopped after a strong
increase in resistance (.55 kV). Secondly, after the experiment we
confirmed for a random set of 4 sham and 4 active codes that they
were correctly linked to the sham or active stimulation procedure
by examining the current with an amperometer. This was the case
for all 8 codes. Thirdly, we note that of the 100,000 possible codes
that can be entered into the DC-stimulator only 200 are allowed,
minimizing the possibility of erroneously entered codes.
After turning on stimulation the participant waited for 10
minutes before starting the task in order to ensure the effects of
stimulation were fully established [9]. Altogether participants
received 25 minutes of stimulation at 2 mA. It is known that
cortical excitability changes outlast such stimulation durations by
over an hour ([9], though see [32]). The window of stimulation
therefore need not fully overlap with the task, and in our design
stimulation ended approximately halfway through the task. It
should be noted that choices for stimulation parameters are based
on studies of motor cortex stimulation. It is possible that these
parameters, when used on frontal areas, have different effects. To
our knowledge there is no published data on this, though we note
our protocol is similar to that of other studies using tDCS on
dlPFC [10,13].
Results
Participants earned (mean6SD) £8.2562.56 during Active
stimulation and £8.3062.39 during Sham stimulation (no
difference in paired samples t-test, t(21) ,1). Participants missed
0.1060.37% of trials during Active stimulation and 0.0960.18%
of trials during Sham stimulation (no difference in paired sampled
t-test, t(21) ,1).
For comparison to previous studies using this task we plot the
stay probabilities based on reward/no-reward and common/
uncommon transition on the previous trial (Figure 2). Qualitatively
the pattern in both the Active and Sham condition resembles that
of a hybrid controller (Figure 1B, right) in which choices are
influenced both by model-based and model-free control. To
quantify these influences and examine effects of trials that extend
beyond the previous (lag-1) trial, we performed a hierarchical
regression analysis (see Table 1 for regressors). This revealed that
all model-based and model-free regressors were significantly larger
than zero, meaning both systems rely on events at least 3 trials into
the past (Figure 3; see Table 1 for statistics). Contrary to our
hypothesis we did not find a difference between the Active and
Sham stimulation conditions in any of the contrasts (see Table 2
for statistics). We therefore report no evidence for an effect of
anodal tDCS to right dlPFC on model-free or model-based
control. In subsequent analyses we explored whether this null
effect was due to a lack of power in our experiment or due to an
inability of tDCS to right dlPFC to modulate model-based or
model-free control.
To estimate the power in our experiment we gathered effect size
estimates in the published literature for manipulations involving
Figure 2. Stay probabilities as a function of reward and
transition on previous trial. Participants showed a pattern of stay
probabilities characteristic of hybrid model-based/model-free control
(cf. Figure 1B) during both Sham and Active stimulation of dlPFC. Error
bars indicate SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086850.g002
Figure 3. Model-based and model-free influences on choice.We
estimated the dependence of a choice at trial t on reward and transition
events in trials t-1 up to t-3. These regression coefficients can be
interpreted as model-based and model-free influences on choice, and
larger coefficients indicate a stronger influence over choice. Firstly, all
regression coefficients in the plot are significantly larger than zero,
suggesting that model-based and model-free systems did not just rely
on events on the previous trial but rather on events as far as 3 trials in
the past. We did not observe any difference between Active and Sham
conditions. Error bars indicate SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086850.g003
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the 2-step task [23,25] and for two tDCS experiments on dlPFC
(enhancement of working memory [11]; reduction in risk-taking
[10]). We were unable to extract effect size estimates from three
other tDCS studies on the dlPFC [13,33,34]. For purposes of the
power analyses we assumed that a tDCS effect on model-based
control has an effect size, expressed in Cohen’s d, similar to these
studies. Our power to detect this effect, given a two-tailed alpha of
0.05 and sample size of 22, was then at least 0.60 (Figure 4).
Although this is not as high as the normative power of 0.80, it is
considerably higher than many studies in cognitive neuroscience
[35]. However, to support our claim that tDCS to right dlPFC
does not affect model-based and model-free control we formally
tested this hypothesis in a model comparison.
The analyses presented above rely on a frequentist approach
and hence are framed in terms of null hypothesis testing, which
precludes strong conclusions being drawn about the absence of an
experimental effect. Hence, based on the preceding analyses we
cannot decisively conclude that the null model is more likely
compared to the full model that allows for differences in model-
free or model-based control in Active versus Sham conditions.
Bayesian statistics, by contrast, allow inferences to be made about
the absence of experimental effects, and we thus exploited this
approach to further probe our results. Thus, we fit three models to
the data that were identical to the full model, except that the
model-free and/or model-based regressors were assumed identical
between stimulation conditions. The first model contained a single
set of model-free regressors for both stimulation conditions; the
second contained a single set of model-based regressors for both
stimulation conditions; and the third (‘null’) contained a single set
of model-based and a single set of model-free regressors for both
stimulation conditions (see Table 3 for the regressors in the null
model). We then performed Bayesian model selection using the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) that are returned by the lme4 package for each
model (see Table 4). Although derived within different frame-
works, both the BIC and AIC can be thought of as approximations
to the true model evidence [36], both containing a term reflecting
the likelihood of the model given the data (the ‘accuracy’ term) and
a penalization term reflecting the number of parameters in the
model (the ‘complexity’ term). As such, the difference in the values
of the Information Criteria between models approximates the log
Bayes factor, which is the ratio of probabilities of the model given
the data. The BIC difference was 900 in favor of the null model
when compared to the full model that contains a separate set of
model-based and model-free regressors for the Active and Sham
condition. This indicates the null model was e900 times more likely
than the full model. The AIC, which penalizes model complexity
less harshly than the BIC, was 100 in favor of the null model
compared to the full model, i.e. the null model was e100 times more
likely. We found a similar pattern of results for the model-free
clamped and model-based clamped models which were .e29 and
.e44 less likely than the null model, respectively. Therefore we can
conclude that it is significantly more likely that tDCS had no effect
on model-based or model-free control than that it did.
To test for session effects we performed a hierarchical logistic
regression with identical regressors as those described in Table 1,
but instead of Active and Sham we coded the regressors as session
1 and 2, respectively. The equivalent contrasts to Table 2 were all
p..15 except effect for Lag on MF in session 1, p= .003, and
session 2, p = .06. This suggests that model-based and model-free
control do not change with additional exposure to the task, which
replicates previous studies [23,25].
Both model-based and model-free control make equivalent
predictions for second-stage choices as there is no task structure to
exploit. We nevertheless explored the effects of stimulation on 1-
step reward learning. We examined second-stage choices using
hierarchical logistic regression similar to our analysis of first-stage
choices: stay-switch behavior was regressed against reward
received on the most recent trial involving that second-stage pair
Table 2. Contrasts performed on the full model.
Contrast estimate SE x2 (1 df) p
MF Active.Sham 2155.32 119.50 1.69 0.1937
MB Active.Sham 22.17 131.42 0.03 0.8661
MF/MB6Active/Sham 2177.49 192.33 0.85 0.3561
MF Lag-1 Active.Sham 287.49 55.46 2.49 0.1146
MF Lag-2 Active.Sham 6.09 54.82 0.01 0.9115
MF Lag-3 Active.Sham 273.93 50.87 2.11 0.1461
MB Lag-1 Active.Sham 18.35 59.86 0.09 0.7592
MB Lag-2 Active.Sham 226.57 60.15 0.20 0.6587
MB Lag-3 Active.Sham 30.39 54.31 0.31 0.5758
Lag MF Active 114.16 55.61 4.21 0.0401
Lag MF Sham 127.72 45.43 7.90 0.0049
Lag MB Active 43.72 60.32 0.53 0.4686
Lag MB Sham 55.76 45.04 1.53 0.2157
Lag MF.MB 142.40 124.64 1.31 0.2532
Lag MF Active.Sham 213.57 65.62 0.04 0.8362
Lag MB Active.Sham 212.04 70.89 0.03 0.8651
Lag MF/MB6Active/Sham 21.53 102.76 0.00 0.9882
MF=model-free; MB=model-based; SE = standard error; x2 = chi-square
distribution; df = degrees of freedom; Lag denotes the effect of time. Bold-face
indicates p,.05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086850.t002
Figure 4. Statistical power to detect true effects. We estimated
statistical power in our study based on effect size estimates taken from
the published literature. We could then compute the power in our
study based on 22 participants and a false positive rate of 0.05 (two-
sided alpha). Assuming any true effect of tDCS would have a similar
magnitude as the studies shown in the figure, the current study had a
power of 50–80%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086850.g004
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(i.e. lag-1 only). Transition was not included as a factor because
second-stage choices are assumed to be independent of the
transition type that led to the state. We observed that in both
stimulation conditions there was a main effect of reward, such that
if a particular stimulus was rewarded in the most recent encounter
with that second-stage pair it was more likely to be chosen again
(Active, mean 6 SE=0.9660.13, p = 9.4610213; Sham, mean 6
SE=0.8260.11, p = 5.46610213). There was a trend-level effect
of stimulation-by-reward suggesting a stronger influence of reward
under Active stimulation (mean 6 SE difference = 0.1460.08;
p = .07), but given the large amount of statistical tests performed
we do not further consider this marginal effect. Together, these
results suggest stimulation had no effect on second-stage choices.
Discussion
Here we provide evidence that tDCS to right dlPFC does not
affect model-based or model-free control in an established
behavioral paradigm. In a double-blind design we confirmed that
participants used both model-free and model-based strategies to
solve the task, and we could quantify the extent to which either
strategy was used. A putative enhancement of right dlPFC activity
through Active compared to Sham anodal tDCS stimulation did
not significantly change the level of model-based or model-free
control. Formally testing this null effect, we provide evidence that
a null model predicting no effect of stimulation performed
significantly better than more complex models predicting an effect
of stimulation on model-based control, model-free control, or
both.
We hypothesized that an enhancement of right dlPFC would
improve model-based control, similar to beneficial tDCS effects
observed on risk taking [10], probabilistic learning [13] and
working memory [11]. Based on published tDCS studies and
studies of model-based control, we estimated our study had more
than 60% statistical power to detect such an effect were it to exist.
Although our power was potentially lower than the often cited
80% power standard (e.g. [37]), it was considerably higher than
.75% of neuroscience studies as determined recently in a meta-
analysis [35]. Despite this, we observed a null effect of tDCS on
model-based control. However, frequentist statistics do not allow
us to conclude the null hypothesis was a significantly better
explanation than the alternatives in which stimulation does have
an effect. We therefore performed a complementary model
comparison using information-theoretic measures to formally
show this [38]. Together, these analyses support our conclusion
that tDCS to right dlPFC has no effect on model-based or model-
free control.
There is a modest literature on improvement in cognition
through tDCS of the right dlPFC, and this begs the question why
no effect was found in our experiment. This is even more
surprising because the dlPFC is implicated in model-based
processes [18–22] and when the region is transiently disrupted
using transcranial magnetic stimulation, model-based control is
selectively impaired [23]. Here we speculate that our null result is
most likely due to an inability of tDCS to improve the specific
component processes of model-based control subserved by the
dlPFC.
Firstly, little is known about the physiological effects of tDCS in
prefrontal cortex [39], though this is a rapidly developing field
[32]. While there is evidence that anodal stimulation over M1
increases the motor evoked potential (MEP) size elicited by TMS
[40], it is not clear how the cellular physiology of the dlPFC is
changed following anodal stimulation, nor what the physiological
underpinnings of model-based control in the dlPFC are. Despite
Table 3. Regressors in the null model which contains the
same MB and MF regressors for the Active and Sham
stimulation conditions.
regressor estimate SE z-value p
intercept 0.24 0.03 7.78 ,0.0001
Active 2269.68 179.42 21.50 0.1328
MF Lag-1 332.27 48.71 6.82 ,0.0001
MF Lag-2 285.59 43.58 6.55 ,0.0001
MF Lag-3 208.50 48.78 4.27 ,0.0001
MB Lag-1 234.64 61.35 3.82 0.0001
MB Lag-2 194.46 64.68 3.01 0.0026
MB Lag-3 180.81 45.37 3.99 0.0001
Active transition Lag-1 211.12 35.88 20.31 0.7566
Active transition Lag-2 7.89 31.01 0.25 0.7993
Active transition Lag-3 220.15 33.11 20.61 0.5428
Sham transition Lag-1 0.98 40.73 0.02 0.9809
Sham transition Lag-2 15.32 32.40 0.47 0.6365
Sham transition Lag-3 2.99 35.05 0.09 0.9320
MF=model-free; MB=model-based; SE = standard error. Lag denotes the effect
of time. Bold-face indicates p,.05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086850.t003
Table 4. Model comparison between a null model (one set of model-based and model-free regressors for both stimulation
conditions) and more complex models that allow for an effect of tDCS on model-based control, model-free control, or both, which
shows the null model is significantly more plausible than any of the models that allow for an effect of tDCS on behavioral control.
Model
No. of regressors
per subject BIC DBIC AIC DAIC
Bayes factor in favor of null model
based on AIC
null model 13 18553 0 17752 0 –
separate model-free
regressors for Active and Sham
16 18962 409 17796 44 1.361019
separate model-based
regressors for Active and Sham
16 18947 394 17781 29 3.961012
full model 19 19453 900 17852 100 2.761043
The second column refers to the number of regressors in the hierarchical regression at the individual subject level (cf. Table 1 and 3).
BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion; AIC: Akaike’s Information Criterion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086850.t004
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these unknowns, we suggest here that the neural mechanisms for
model-based control in right dlPFC are not amenable to
improvement through anodal tDCS.
Secondly, we used a task to assess model-based control that has
previously been shown to be susceptible to manipulation
[23,25,26], we used a set of stimulation parameters that are
widely used in the tDCS community [41], and we replicated
previous observations of dual control by model-based and model-
free systems. Together, this suggests our null result is not due to the
introduction of uncertain elements (e.g. novel task or novel
stimulation parameters) into the study design.
Despite the use of established methods, we cannot exclude
methodological issues as the cause of the null effect altogether.
Although we are confident the null effect is not due to faulty
equipment or errors in the double-blinding procedure (see
Methods), potential other issues might include inaccurate electrode
placement, a problem that can be alleviated by stereotactic
navigation using anatomical scans as commonly used in transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation [42], and unpredictable current flow
based on electrode placement, which might be alleviated by
computational models of current flow [43].
We were particularly careful to employ a double-blinded design
to eliminate any stimulation-dependent influence from the
experimenter on task performance. The task used here requires
relatively extensive involvement of the experimenter in the task
instructions. In a double-blinded design, then, these effects can be
most reliably attributed to the experimental manipulation of
interest rather than to unintended information biases [44]. We
note that no published work has manipulated the instruction of the
2-step task to examine its influence on model-based and model-
free performance.
In conclusion, we provide evidence that anodal stimulation of
the right dlPFC by tDCS does not alter model-based or model-free
control in our paradigm. This observation was made in the context
of extensive and causal evidence for a role of right dlPFC in
model-based control in humans. As such, our results should not be
interpreted as providing evidence that the right dlPFC is not
involved in model-based control; rather, our main finding is that
anodal stimulation does not necessarily enhance this function. An
open question is whether tDCS might improve performance on
tasks that are more taxing on the model-based system (e.g. [45]).
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